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LETTERS OF CREDIT: THE ROLE OF ISSUER DISCRETION
IN DETERMINING DOCUMENTARY COMPLIANCE
INTRODUCTION
The letter of credit' developed in response to the need for assured pay-
ment in commercial transactions.2 The letter of credit arrangement typi-
cally involves three parties: the issuer, usually a bank;3 the customer,
usually the buyer of merchandise;4 and the beneficiary of the letter of
credit, the seller.5 The buyer and seller enter into a contract for the sale
1. A letter of credit is "an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request
of a customer. . . that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon
compliance with the conditions specified in the credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(I)(a) (1977); see
International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (UCP), art. 2 (Publ. No. 400) (rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.C.P.]; J.
Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits r 2.03, at 2-4
(1984).
In addition to the issuing or opening bank, the transaction often involves a second
bank, either an advising or a confirming bank, typically a correspondent of the issuer in
the locality of the beneficiary. Id. 1.03, at 1-11; see T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial
Code Commentary and Law Digest 5-103[A][4], at 5-15 (1978); International Chamber
of Commerce, Guide to Documentary Credit Operations 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Guide to Documentary Credit Operations]. The role of the advising bank is limited: It
merely "gives notification of the issuance of a credit by another bank." U.C.C. § 5-
103(1)(e) (1977); see 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, The Law of Modern Commercial
Practices §§ 7:3, at 229, 7:7, at 234 (rev. ed. 1981) (advising bank is not primarily liable).
The confirming bank, on the other hand, actually assumes the responsibility of reviewing
the documentary presentment and honoring the draft. The confirming bank is then reim-
bursed by the issuer. See U.C.C. §§ 5-103(1)(f), 5-114(3) (1977); A. Squillante & J. Fon-
seca, supra, § 7:8, at 235.
There are two types of letters of credit: the commercial credit and the standby credit.
The commercial credit is employed in a sale of merchandise; it serves to ensure payment
to the seller of the goods. See 1. Dolan, supra, at A-34. The standby credit serves a
purpose similar to that of a guaranty by providing payment to a beneficiary upon default
of a party that was obliged to perform. Id. 1.04, at 1-12 to -15. This Note focuses on
the commercial credit, but its analysis is applicable to the standby credit.
2. See J. White & R. Summers, Handbook on the Law Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 18-1, at 704-05 (2d ed. 1980); Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law,
24 Ariz. L. Rev. 239, 241 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Harfield I]; Joseph, Letters of
Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Functions, 94 Banking LJ. 816, 816
(1977); Mentschicoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus. Law. 107, 111 (1963); see
also Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461,464 (2d Cir. 1970) (primary
purpose of the letter of credit is to provide assurance); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hart-
ford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 499, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977) (letter of
credit provides beneficiary with "assured, prompt payment from a solvent party").
3. "Issuer" is defined as "a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. § 5-
103(l)(c) (1977). The issuer need not be a bank, see id., but it is essential to the transac-
tion that the issuer be a party of known solvency, see B. Kozolchyk, Commercial Letters
of Credit in the Americas § 1.01[3], at 9 (1966).
4. The customer, or account party, is "a buyer or other person who causes an issuer
to issue a credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977); see Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wil-
son Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1313 (1976); H.
Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances 33 (5th ed. 1974).
5. The beneficiary of a credit is the "person who is entitled under its terms to draw
or demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(I)(d) (1977); see Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l
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of goods and the buyer has the bank issue a letter of credit in the seller's
favor.6 The letter constitutes "a formal promise by a bank or another
party of known solvency. . . to pay the draft or the demand for pay-
ment by a beneficiary, whose compliance with the terms of the credit is a
prerequisite of the enforceability of the promise."7 The terms, set by the
customer,' might include the presentation of a variety of documents, de-
pending upon the parties' individual needs.9 Once the beneficiary makes
his demand for payment, the bank is obliged to review the documents
presented and honor the draft if the presentment complies with the terms
of the credit."° Upon honoring the draft, the bank is entitled to immedi-
Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 315-16 (Me. 1978); U.C.P., supra note 1, art. 2. The beneficiary is
usually the seller of the merchandise. See, e.g., Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H.
Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 1977) (seller of cabinets had buyer secure pay-
ment through issuance of a credit); Vazman, S.A. v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 418 F. Supp.
1084, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (credit issued in favor of seller of cement).
6. See B. Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards V 8.1[1],
at 8-3 (rev. ed. 1981); J. Dolan, supra note 1, V 1.01[3], at 1-5 to -6.
7. B. Kozolchyk, supra note 3, § 1.01[3], at 9; see Rutcofsky, Letters of Credit in
Bankruptcy, in Credit Manual of Commercial Laws, 1983, at xxii (1983); Note, Letters of
Credit: A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 848,
869 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance];
see also U.C.C. § 5-103 comment 1 (1977) (defining "engagement" as used in § 5-103 as
"a promise to honor"); cf. 6 Michie on Banks and Banking § 31, at 414 (perm. ed. 1975)
("Letters of credit do not usually contain a direct promise to pay; but such promise is
implied or inferred from the statement that the credit has been established and is
irrevocable.").
8. The customer submits an application to the bank for issuance of the credit. The
application is usually drafted by the bank and takes the form of a contract of adhesion.
See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 1-3, at 6 (2d ed. 1977) (a contract of
adhesion is a standardized form). See T. Quinn, supra note 1, 1 5-101[A][l][b], at 5-2 to -
3. For a sample application, see J. Dolan, supra note 1, at A-77 to -85. The application
sets the terms and conditions of the agreement between the customer and the issuer and is
referred to as the application agreement. J. Dolan, supra note 1, 2.01, at 2-2. The
customer is required to specify in the application the documents to be presented by the
beneficiary. Guide to Documentary Credit Operations, supra note 1, at 8; McLaughlin,
Letters of Credit and Warehouse Receipts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1982, at 1, col.1; e.g., J.
Dolan, supra note 1, at A-75; A. Lowenfeld, International Private Trade DS 77 (2d ed.
1981).
9. See H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 57. See infra note 24.
10. "An issuer must examine documents with care so as to ascertain that on their face
they appear to comply with the terms of the credit . . . ." U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977).
The issuer must honor a draft that complies with the terms of the credit without looking
to the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary. Id. § 5-114(1); see
Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 686 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1982); KMW
Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979); East Girard Say. Ass'n v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Bossier Bank &
Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1080 (6th Cir. 1977); Fidelity
Bank v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211, 214 (10th Cir. 1972); Cappaert En-
ters. v. Citizens & S. Int'l Bank, 486 F. Supp. 819, 826 (E.D. La. 1980); Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734, 736 (D. Minn. 1976); West Va.
Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 497-99, 378 A.2d 562, 565-66
(1977); Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 395-96, 146 N.E.
636, 639 (1925); J. Dolan, supra note 1, 6.01, at 6-2; Note, The Application of Compul-
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ate reimbursement by the customer.1"
By substituting a bank's credit for the buyer's credit," the letter of
credit theoretically eliminates three major risks otherwise imposed on the
seller in the documentary sale. 3 First is the insolvency risk. 4 If the
buyer is unable to pay for the merchandise, the seller will be forced to
dispose of the goods, often in a market that is foreign to him. 5 In addi-
tion, any cause of action by the seller for damages would provide no
relief in the case of buyer insolvency. Second, the seller faces the dishon-
esty risk. The buyer may wrongfully refuse payment, especially when he
discovers a better bargain elsewhere due to a decline in market prices.' 6
Finally, there is the honest-dispute risk. The buyer may refuse payment
for a legitimate reason, such as nonconformity of a prior shipment. 7
The bank's role in objectively reviewing the documents without looking
to the underlying contract between the buyer and the seller'8 promotes a
greater willingness on the part of parties with little or no previous ac-
quaintance to enter into commercial transactions.' 9 The effective opera-
sory Joinder, Intervention, Impleader and Attachment to Letter of Credit Litigation, 52
Fordham L. Rev. 957, 966-67 (1984).
11. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1977); see J. Dolan, supra note 1, 7.05, at 7-53 to -54; see
also B. Clark, supra note 6, 8.11, at 8-72 ("reimbursement most frequently takes the
form of debiting the customer's demand deposit account, or other direct payment, but it
can be deferred under a credit arrangement between issuer and customer").
12. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550,
552-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka,
415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1976); National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank & Trust
Co., 408 F. Supp. 684, 690 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.
1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 499,
378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977); see Continental Natl Bank v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d
312, 316 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 528
F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 27, 44.
13. A documentary sale allows the seller to receive payment for merchandise before
the buyer takes possession. This is accomplished by requiring the buyer to pay "cash
against documents" rather than cash upon receipt of the goods. See J. White & R. Sum-
mers, supra note 2, § 18-1, at 704-05; see also U.C.C. § 2-319(4) (1977) (F.O.B. and
F.A.S. contracts); id § 2-320(4) (C.I.F. and C. & F. contracts). The documentary sale
protects the seller from the risk that the buyer will receive the goods and later refuse
payment. See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, § 1.1.
14. See 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:3, at 227; J. White & R. Sum-
mers, supra note 2, § 18-1, at 706; Harfield I, supra note 2, at 241.
15. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-1, at 706.
16. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 121 (2d ed. 1975). The insol-
vency risk and the dishonesty risk have not been eliminated completely by the letter of
credit. See infra notes 41, 121 and accompanying text. Buyer's insolvency and dishon-
esty often lead to examination of the documentary presentment that is unfavorable to the
beneficiary. See infra notes 41, 121 and accompanying text.
17. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-1, at 706; see B. Clark, supra note 6, fj
8.1[1], at 8-3.
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. The letter of credit is often employed in international sales, where the parties'
distance makes it difficult for the seller to monitor the conduct and financial status of the
buyer. See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, § 5.3, at 130; Joseph, supra note 2, at 816-17.
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tion of the letter of credit, however, requires that the parties understand
and carry out their duties under the arrangement.
Each party's obligation is triggered by the beneficiary's demand for
payment. 20 The issuer's refusal to pay a complying presentment consti-
tutes wrongful dishonor for which the beneficiary has a remedy at law. 2'
Likewise, payment when the documents are noncomplying imposes on
the issuer contractual liability to the customer.22 Thus, the issue most
frequently litigated is whether the documents presented comply with the
terms of the credit.23 Documentary discrepancies are inevitable in light
of the variety of documents required. 4 The customer is encouraged to
set specific terms, 25 but the likelihood of less-than-exact compliance in-
creases with the degree of specificity.26
Recognizing the importance of flexibility in the development of letter
of credit law, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code declined to
establish a rigid rule of compliance.27 Instead, the U.C.C. provides that
The domestic use of the letter of credit, however, has increased considerably. See
Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 251 (1972).
The growing popularity of the letter of credit is attributable to its adaptability in commer-
cial transactions. In addition to its payment function, the letter of credit has a secondary
financing function: The beneficiary can finance underlying transactions by assigning
rights to proceeds under the letter of credit. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-
1, at 708; id. § 18-9, at 752; see Harfield, Secondary Uses of Commercial Credits, 44
Colum. L. Rev. 899, 908 (1944); Joseph, supra note 2, at 818-19; see also Guide to Docu-
mentary Credit Operations, supra note 1, at 32 (description of the "back-to-back" credit).
20. See U.C.C. § 5-114(l)-(3) (1977) (issuer must pay complying presentment and
upon payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement from its customer); J. Dolan, supra
note 1, V 2.01, at 2-2.
21. See U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1977). The beneficiary's recovery for wrongful dishonor
by an issuer includes the face amount of the draft, incidental damages and interest, less
any amount realized by disposition of the goods. Id.
22. H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 105; see 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1,
§ 7:17, at 265.
23. 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:25, at 277; Comment, Letters of
Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 La. L. Rev. 581, 597 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Current Theories and Usages]; see Megrah, Risk Aspects of the Irrevocable Documentary
Credit, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 255, 255 (1982).
24. Documents ordinarily required in addition to the draft include the seller's com-
mercial invoice, a bill of lading and an insurance policy. H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 57.
There may, however, be additional requirements such as a consular invoice, a certificate
of weight or quality, and import or export licenses. Id.
25. See T. Quinn, supra note 1, % 5-1 14[A][8], at S5-24 (Cum. Supp. No. 2 1984). The
customer in the letter of credit transaction is likely to protect himself by requiring spe-
cific documents such as an inspection certificate. Absent such requirements, the buyer
exposes himself to substantial risks because the beneficiary/seller will have received pay-
ment under the letter of credit before the customer has even had the opportunity to ex-
amine the goods. See J. Dolan, supra note 1, % 3.07[5], at 3-28. But see U.C.P., supra
note 1, art. 5 (advising issuing banks to "discourage any attempt by the [customer] ...
to include excessive detail").
26. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 16, at 121 ("it would be a rare set of
documents that could meet the impossible standards of purity which the theory de-
mands"). Where there is a series of documents required, there is an increasing chance
that they will not conform precisely with the credit terms. See id. at 121-22.
27. See U.C.C. § 5-102 official comment 2 (1977). The drafters of the Uniform Com-
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the documents presented must "on their face. . appear to comply with
the terms of the credit."2 The task of formulating an appropriate stan-
dard of compliance was delegated specifically to the judiciary. 9 Diver-
gent views of the courts as to the interests in need of protection have
resulted in the evolution of three different standards of compliance:
strict compliance, substantial compliance and a hybrid standard employ-
ing both strict and substantial compliance.
Many courts insist that anything less than strict or exact compliance is
insufficient.30 While recognizing the harshness to beneficiaries whose
documents contain only slight discrepancies, 3' the advocates of strict
compliance defend it as the only way to ensure certainty in the transac-
tion.32 Simple classification of every document as either complying or
noncomplying obviates the need to inquire into the materiality of the
discrepancy, thus rendering the issuer's function purely ministerial. 3
Other courts have acknowledged the need for strict compliance but
allow for substantial or reasonable compliance in certain situations.3
For example, if the terms of the credit require presentment of several
mercial Code (U.C.C.) noted that "[t]he more important areas not covered by [Article
Five] revolve around the question of when documents in fact and in law do or do not
comply with the terms of the credit." Id.; see Note, Judicial Development of Letters of
Credit Law: A Reappraisal, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 144, 151 & n.40 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Judicial Development].
28. U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977).
29. See idL § 5-102 official comment 2.
30. See, ag., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir.
1983); Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
637, 640 (2d Cir. 1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 175
(3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528
F.2d 802, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-Am.
Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D. Ariz. 1978); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see A Solution to the
Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 862; Judicial Development, supra
note 27, at 151.
31. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-Am. Sports Club, Inc., 448
F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Ariz. 1978); J. Dolan, supra note 1, 4.08[2], at 4-36; A Solution to
the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 870.
32. See J. Dolan, supra note 1, 4.08[2], at 4-36; Derrick, An Issuing Bank's Duty of
Payment Under An Irrevocable Letter of Credit: Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala
v. United States National Bank of Oregon, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 835, 836 (1970); A Solution
to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 875-76.
33. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840-41 (2d Cir.
1962); A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 859; Mc-
Laughlin, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1.
34. See, e.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d
699, 705 (1st Cir. 1978); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385
F.2d 230, 237 (Ist Cir. 1967), cerL denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Crocker Commercial
Servs. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360, 1362-63 (N.D. MI1. 1981); First Arlington
Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 111. App. 3d 802, 814-16, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1298-99 (1980); First
Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 814-15, 256 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1979); see J.
Dolan, supra note 1, 4.08[2], at 4-35 to -36.
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documents, and one of the documents presented varies slightly from the
terms, the issuer could honor the draft if compliance could be gleaned
from the documents viewed in the aggregate."
Finally, some courts apply a bifurcated standard imposing strict com-
pliance when the beneficiary sues the issuer but substantial compliance
when the customer sues the issuer.36 These courts reason that by vesting
some discretionary power in the bank, greater equity will be achieved
with regard to the beneficiary.37
The inability of courts to agree upon a uniform standard is attributable
primarily to disagreement over one fundamental issue: the extent to
which the notions of "equity" and "substantiality" recognized in con-
tract law should be relevant in the determination of compliance.3a Part I
of this Note examines the problems encountered by courts in applying
the standards of strict and substantial compliance. It concludes that in
order to reconcile the contractual notions of substantiality and equity
with the need for certainty, it is necessary to define the duties imposed on
the parties by virtue of their relationships. Part II urges that the contrac-
tual relationship between the issuer and the beneficiary be recognized as
analogous to that of the parties to an option contract. Part III argues
that the bifurcated standard, because it vests discretionary power in the
bank, can most equitably and effectively achieve the goals of the letter of
credit. The proper exercise of discretionary power can only be realized,
however, when combined with the contractual duties that arise under the
issuer/beneficiary relationship.
35. See Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699,
703 (1st Cir. 1978) ("a case of the greater including the smaller"); Banco Espanol de
Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1967) ("[n]ot only does
haec verba not control absolutely, . . . but some courts now cast their eyes on a wider
scene than a single document") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); 2
A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:25, at 279 (individual documents submitted
by the beneficiary should be read together in determining compliance with the terms of
the credit).
36. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-6, at 731-32 (quoting 3 State of N.Y.
Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-Documen-
tary Letters of Credit, Legislative Doc. No. 65(F), at 66-67 (1955) [herinafter cited as
New York Study], reprinted in 3 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law
Revision Comm'n for 1955, at 1634-35 [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report]); see, e.g.,
Transamerica Delaval Inc. v. Citibank, 545 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Far E.
Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio 1977); see
J. Dolan, supra note 1, 9.03[l][a], at 9-22 to -24; T. Quinn, supra note 1, q 5-114[AJ[8],
at S5-22 to -24 (Cum. Supp. No. 2 1984); see also Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., No. 183 Civ. 1767, slip op. at 13-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1985)(discuss-
ing the bifurcated standard but noting that it is only a suggested approach that has not
actually been followed by New York Courts).
37. See New York Study, supra note 36, at 66-67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra
note 36, at 1634; T. Quinn, supra note 1, 1 5-114[A][8], at 55-23 (Cum. Supp. No. 2
1984).
38. See Harfield I, supra note 2, at 242; Judicial Development, supra note 27, at 166.
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I. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF COMPLIANCE
Analysis of the following hypothetical will illustrate the concerns of
the courts in determining an appropriate standard of compliance. S
agrees to sell and B to buy 100 tons of cashews. S, never having dealt
with B and wishing to avoid the risks of non-payment, 39 requests that B
have a letter of credit issued. B has Bank X issue a letter of credit in S's
favor. The terms of the credit are: "100 tons cashews." Documents to be
presented are: draft, bill of lading, invoice and certificate of inspection.
Expiration date is April 10, 1986. Upon shipping the goods, S sends the
required documents to the bank. The documents are received on April 8.
The invoice and certificate of inspection state "100 tons cashews,"
whereas the bill of lading states "100 tons nuts." In most cases, the cus-
tomer would have no reason to object to the discrepancy because he is
eager to receive the merchandise.' In this case, however, B becomes
insolvent41 or, alternatively, there has been a drastic decline in the mar-
ket price of cashews. Bank X, aware of B's misfortune, now fears that it
will not be reimbursed if it honors the draft.42 What should the bank do?
A. Strict Compliance: The Safety Valve
The standard of strict compliance affords the greatest protection to the
bank and its customer. Under this standard, the bank is obliged to pay
only when the documents presented conform exactly with the terms of
the credit.43 Thus, the beneficiary in the hypothetical would be denied
payment.
The inequity of this outcome is twofold. First, the beneficiary is de-
nied payment even though a closer reading of the documents indicates
that there has been compliance with the terms of the credit. In the situa-
tion described, only the description in the bill of lading varies from the
terms of the credit. The bill of lading is a shipping document provided
by a party with very little knowledge about the actual content of the
39. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
40. See T. Quinn, supra note 1, 5-101[A][3], at 5-5.
41. See Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699,
702 (1st Cir. 1978) (buyer became bankrupt and sought to avoid payment).
42. The major question "from the issuer's point of view [is] whether the customer will
reimburse the issuer for the payment which has been made." Mentschicoff, supra note 2,
at 110.
43. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text. Courts have held that any discrepancy, regardless of its materiality, would justify
the bank's dishonor of the draft. See, eg., Bank of Italy v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 236
N.Y. 106, 108-09, 140 N.E. 211, 211-12 (1923) ("raisins" vs. "dried grapes"), cert. de-
nied, 264 U.S. 581 (1924); Oriental Pac. (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 78
Misc. 2d 819, 820, 357 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958-59 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("woolen knitwears" versus
"ladies' sweaters, dresses, pants and skirts"); J.H. Rayner & Co. v. Hambros Bank, Ltd.,
[1943] 1 K.B. 37, 40 (C.A.) ("machine-shelled groundnut kernals" versus "Coromandel
groundnuts"); Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, 27 Lloyd's List LR. 49, 52
(1927) ("[t]here is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do
just as well").
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shipment." The invoice and certificate of inspection, on the other hand,
are submitted by the manufacturer and the appointed inspector respec-
tively, both of whom have examined the merchandise.45 When the docu-
ments are reviewed objectively, refusal to honor seems unjustified."
Second, even if the bank were to determine that there was documentary
compliance, it would nevertheless be prohibited from honoring the draft
under the strict compliance standard because it would be liable to its
customer for breach of contract. 47
The seller's only remedy in the hypothetical would be to sue the cus-
tomer directly on the underlying contract.48 Requiring the seller to pur-
sue a cause of action against the customer imposes on him the very risks
sought to be avoided in employing the letter of credit as a payment de-
vice.49 Insistence on strict compliance does not merely raise a question
of hardship; it threatens to undermine the very purpose of the letter of
credit.50
Some commentators have acknowledged, 5' and even applauded,52 the
44. The bill of lading is "the carrier's receipt for what he has received for shipment as
well as his contract for carriage." H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 75 (footnote omitted); see,
e.g., J. Dolan, supra note 1, at A-66 to -70; A. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at DS-72 to -73.
45. The commercial invoice is the "seller's representation as to the merchandise
sold." H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 75. The certificate of inspection is a representation of
a third party who examines and attests to the quantity or quality of the goods. See id. at
67-68.
46. In the landmark case, Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146
N.E. 347 (1924), the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue presented in the
hypothetical, holding that the bank's payment was justified although the invoice de-
scribed the goods as "Alicante Bouchez grapes" and the bill of lading merely stated
"grapes." Id. at 238, 146 N.E. at 348. But see J.H. Rayner & Co. v. Hambros Bank Ltd.,
[1943] 1 K.B. 37, 40 (court upheld dishonor where terms of the bill of lading varied
slightly from the terms of the invoice).
The U.C.P. states that "[t]he description of the goods in the commercial invoice must
correspond with the description in the credit. In all other documents, the goods may be
described in general terms not inconsistent with the description of the goods in the
credit." U.C.P., supra note 1, art. 41(c). The U.C.P. does not have the force of law,
however. H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 225, 227. It is a series of fairly generalized rules.
Id. at 225-26. Like the U.C.C., see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text, the U.C.P.
does not establish any absolute rule and is therefore subject to interpretation by parties to
the transaction and by the courts. See B. Kozolchyck, supra note 3, at 88; Judicial Devel-
opment, supra note 27, at 148 n.28. Thus, the outcome of the hypothetical under the
U.C.P. remains unclear: the court will still be compelled to reconcile the rule of strict
compliance with the general language of the U.C.P.
47. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
48. Cf 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:5, at 231 (letter of credit does
not vary rights of parties to the underlying contract).
49. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
51. See B. Kozolchyck, 9 Int'l Encycl. of Comp. Law 82 (1979) ("customers have a
marked propensity to find deviations from strict compliance whenever there is a sharp
drop in the market price of the goods purchased") [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyck I];
McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 2, col. 1 (noting the argument of advocates of reasonable
compliance that "[s]trict compliance inevitably leads to nit-picking and to hypertechnical
parsing of language by letter of credit issuers intent on extricating themselves from pay-
ment obligations").
1526 [Vol. 53
LETTERS OF CREDIT
application of the strict compliance standard as illustrated in the hypo-
thetical. Others have sought an application of the standard that would
yield more equitable results, primarily through the use of the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel. 3 The bank may consult the customer when it has
received documents that do not comply exactly.' The customer may
then choose to waive the discrepancy, thereby authorizing payment
under the letter. Although the doctrine may be beneficial in some situa-
tions,55 it would be of no value where the customer seeks to extricate
itself from its payment obligation. 6
A second possible solution would be to require the issuer either to
make full disclosure to the beneficiary of all documentary defects at the
time of honor or dishonor or be estopped from raising them at trial."
Ideally, such disclosure would allow the beneficiary to cure the defects."8
52. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 16, at 121.
At least in theory the bank must reject a tender which deviates in the slightest
degree from the ideal. In practice the rule is modified from necessity: it would
be a rare set of documents that could meet the impossible standards of purity
which the theory demands, and credits are, after all, designed to facilitate pay-
ments, not to serve as escape hatches for buyers who have repented of their
bargains. Nevertheless, at a time of sharp market breaks, a bank officer who
cannot, at his customer's request, discover some plausible reason for dishonoring
drafts is hardly worthy of the name.
Id (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). But see T. Quinn, supra note 1, Ir 5-101[A][3],
at 5-6 ("[w]hen the documents appear on their face to comply with the credit but the
bank's customer notifies it that there is a serious shortage in the goods ... the bank must
nevertheless honor the draft").
53. See A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 870-
74; McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 2, col. 2.
54. Banks often do consult with their customers when they deem waiver of a discrep-
ancy to be appropriate. See New York Study, supra note 36, at 73, reprinted in 1955
Report, supra note 36, at 1641; B. Kozolchyck, supra note 3, at 81; J. White & R. Sum-
mers, supra note 2, § 18-6, at 733.
55. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-6, at 732-33; see Corporacion de Mer-
cadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1979); Courtaulds N.
Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1975); Inter-
national Leather Distribs., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); North Am. Foreign Trading Corp.
v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891-92, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1979) (mem.).
56. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 16, at 121. Moreover, under present law,
the customer does not have a good faith obligation to waive immaterial discrepancies in
the documentary presentment. A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance,
supra note 7, at 875.
57. Some courts have insisted on such disclosure. See, eg., Marino Indus. Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 686 F.2d 112, 117-19 (2d Cir. 1982); Corporacion de Mercadeo
Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1979); Barclays Bank D.C.O.
v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S.
1139 (1974); Crocker Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360,
1363 (N.D. 1. 1981); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 538 F.
Supp. 1354, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F.
Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citi-
zens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 785-86 (D. Conn. 1980); U.S. Indus. v. Second New
Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 665-66 (D. Conn. 1978).
58. See A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 871-
73; McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 2, cols. 2-4.; see also U.C.P., supra note 1, art. 16(e) (if
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A problem arises, however, when there is insufficient time to cure the
defects before the expiration of the credit. For example, the documents in
the hypothetical were presented two days before the expiration date.
Even if the discrepancy were immediately discovered by the bank, it is
unlikely that there would be adequate time to cure the deficiency. 9 Time
is of the essence in the letter of credit transaction; 6° the customer sets an
expiration date in order to protect his interest in receiving timely docu-
mentary presentment.
61
B. Substantial Compliance: Relaxation of the Compliance Standard
The hypothetical seller's refuge would be in the standard of substantial
compliance. This standard emerged in an attempt to promote equity to
the beneficiary. 62 It provides protection from "the unregenerate type-
which tries to extricate itself from an unquestioned obligation by the kind
of hypertechnical argument that has often tended to give the term
'banker' pejorative connotations. ' 63  In examining the documents, the
dishonor "is to be made, notice to that effect, stating the reasons therefore, must, without
delay, be given by cable").
59. Some courts have held that estoppel may be invoked only if the beneficiary would
have had sufficient time to cure the deficiency before the expiration of the credit. See
Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 41 (Colo. 1981) (en
banc) ("The [beneficiary] could not have cured the defect since the presentment would
have then been untimely .... Consequently, the [beneficiary] did not detrimentally rely
on the Bank's failure to state as one ground for its dishonor of the drafts that the [benefi-
ciary] presented demand instruments rather than fifteen-day sight drafts.") (citations
omitted).
In Crocker Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ill.
1981), the beneficiary presented documents shortly before the letter of credit was to ex-
pire and instructed the bank to inform it of any defects. See id. at 1361. U.C.C. § 5-
112(1) (1977) provides that the bank be allowed three banking days to review documents
to determine compliance. The bank notified the beneficiary of the discrepancy on the
third day after presentment, but by that time the credit had expired. The court held that
the documentary defects were "hypertechnical language difficulties" that were easily cur-
able. See 538 F. Supp. at 1363. Accordingly, the bank was estopped from raising the
defects as justification for nonpayment because it failed to give prompt notification of the
apparent defects. See id. at 1363-64.
60. J. Dolan, supra note 1, 1 5.03[3][a], at 5-15; A Solution to the Problem of Docu-
mentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 872; see Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218 F.2d 831, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1955).
61. See J. Dolan, supra note 1, 5.03[3][e], at 5-20 to -21.
62. See id. 6.05[2], at 6-27 to -29 (impetus for the substantial compliance standard is
the possibility that the beneficiary will lose the benefit of performance under his contract
with the seller); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-6, at 729 ("Our primary
concern here is with the rights of the beneficiary for wrongful dishonor.")(emphasis in
original); Stoufflet, Payment and Transfer in Documentary Letters of Credit: Interaction
Between the French General Law of Obligations and the Uniform Customs and Practice,
24 Ariz. L. Rev. 267, 270 (1982) ("Formalism provides certainty, but it is also blind to
inequities. . . .It is not surprising that a party suffering as a result of formalistic rigor
tries to evade its consequences by appealing to the general law of obligations.").
63. Crocker Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360, 1362
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
1528 [Vol. 53
LETTERS OF CREDIT
bank is permitted to look beyond mere technical discrepancies,' so as to
determine whether the presentment "complie[s] with the requirements of
the letter of credit in every material respect."65
Opponents of the standard are concerned that its application will lead
to uncertainty in the letter of credit transaction, resulting in increased
litigation and, possibly, an unwillingness on the part of banks to enter
into letter of credit transactions.66 The source of these fears is the blan-
ket proposition that substantial compliance is sufficient.67 An outright
relaxation of the standard is likely to result in a greater number of benefi-
ciary-litigants claiming compliance.68 Furthermore, beneficiaries operat-
ing on the assumption that substantial compliance is sufficient may lose
incentive to adhere closely to the terms of the credit. Consequently, cus-
tomers are likely to challenge the bank's determination of compliance.69
Although these fears are justified, they do not warrant a rejection of the
rationale underlying the standard of substantial compliance. The solu-
tion lies in an approach that honors the traditional concerns underlying
strict compliance and at the same time promotes equity with regard to
the beneficiary.
C. The Bifurcated Standard: The Anomalous Approach
A middle ground could be found in the bifurcated standard,7" which
protects the issuer against suit by the customer for paying despite techni-
cal flaws in the documentary presentment.7 On the other hand, the is-
suer would be entitled to refuse payment by insisting on strict compliance
from the beneficiary.72 This bifurcated standard results in an anomaly.
64. See Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 237
(lst Cir. 1967) (court confessed to "semantic myopia" and looks beyond the technicali-
ties), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968).
65. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705
(1st Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., J. Dolan, supra note 1, 6.02, at 6-4 to -6; Judicial Development, supra
note 27, at 153; A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at
855-56.
67. See Judicial Development, supra note 27, at 151-52.
68. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-6, at 729; A Solution to the
Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 867.
69. See A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 868
("court enforcement of issuer waiver of letter terms upon presentment is per se the en-
forcement, if not the creation, of a breach of the issuer-customer contract").
70. B. Clark, supra note 6, i 8.5[4], at 8-48.
71. See New York Study, supra note 36, at 66-67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra
note 36, at 1634-35; T. Quinn, supra note 1, 5-114[A][8], at S5-23 (Cum. Supp. No. 2
1984); see also Transamerica Delaval Inc. v. Citibank, 545 F. Supp. 200, 203-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying the bifurcated standard: beneficiary's demand, "while not lit-
erally or strictly in accordance with the language of the letter of credit, did substantially
comply with the terms of the letter of credit such that Citibank's payment pursuant to
that demand was reasonable and proper under the circumstances").
72. See New York Study, supra note 36, at 66, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note
36, at 1634; T. Quinn, supra note 1, 5-114[A][8], at S5-23 (Cure. Supp. No. 2 1984); see
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The bank's exercise of its discretionary power 73 is most needed by the
beneficiary when the customer seeks to avoid payment by objecting to
insubstantial discrepancies.74 Yet this is also the time when the bank
would least want to exercise its discretion to pay the beneficiary, because
its customer may refuse reimbursement. Thus, under any of the three
proposed standards, the purposes of the letter of credit are frustrated.
II. THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF THE ISSUER/BENEFICIARY
RELATIONSHIP
The goals of the letter of credit can best be realized by reconciling the
contractual notions of equity and substantiality with the need for cer-
tainty. This reconciliation can only be accomplished by recognizing the
duties of the issuer to the beneficiary that arise by virtue of their
relationship.
A. Basis for Contractual Characterization
Many courts and commentators discuss the three "contracts" that ex-
ist in the letter of credit transaction: buyer/seller, issuer/customer, and
issuer/beneficiary. 75 Although the contractual characterization of the
first two relationships is undisputed,7 6 the description of the issuer/bene-
ficiary relationship as a contract has been repeatedly attacked.77 This
denial of the contractual nature of the letter of credit has become the
basis for many commentators' objections to the application of the notions
of equity and substantiality. 78 The underlying fear is that the characteri-
zation of the issuer/beneficiary relationship as contractual will hinder the
also Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196-97 (S.D.
Ohio 1977) (court applied bifurcated standard and insisted on strict compliance by tile
beneficiary).
73. New York Study, supra note 36, at 67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 36, at
1635 (noting bank's exercise of discretion).
74. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
75. In classifying all three relationships as contractual, courts have noted that the
issuer/beneficiary relationship is governed by traditional contract principles. See Bank of
N.C. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn. 1980); West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415
F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 356 F. Supp. 991, 999 (N.D. Ga. 1973); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays
Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 225, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Space Metals, Inc.,
529 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1974); 6 Michie, supra note 7, § 30, at 406; 2 A. Squillante & J.
Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:15, at 258-59; see also U.C.C. § 5-116 official comment 3
(1977) (letter of credit should be "treated like any other contract").
76. See B. Clark, supra note 6, 8.2[1], at 8-6; J. Dolan, supra note 1, 1 2.08[l]-[2], at
2-15 to -16; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-2, at 711.
77. See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-2, at 711-13; A Solution to
the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 860; Current Theories and
Usages, supra note 23, at 589-92.
78. See J. Dolan, supra note 1, ] 2.02, at 2-3, 1 6.05, at 6-20; A Solution to the Prob-
lem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 859.
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function of the letter of credit because it will lead to the demise of the
strict compliance standard.7 9 This fear is premised on the observation
that courts tend to weaken the strict law of contract when they perceive
the operation of that law as yielding unfair results."'
Opponents of the contractual characterization first point to the inten-
tion of the drafters of the Code "to set an independent theoretical
frame."8" The official comment to the Code plainly demonstrates, how-
ever, that the drafters were not attempting to define the issuer/benefici-
ary relationship, but rather to define the "limited scope" of Article Five
in providing a basic framework for the tripartite structure of the letter of
credit transaction. 2 The comment to the specific provision regarding the
issuer/beneficiary relationship states that "[t]he letter of credit is essen-
tially a contract between the issuer and the beneficiary."8 3 Thus,
although the entire operation of the letter of credit falls within the "in-
dependent theoretical frame," the relationships of the parties are gov-
erned by basic contract principles.8" "The letter of credit itself
constitutes the contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary of
the credit, and the application, together with the letter of credit, consti-
tutes the contract between the applicant [customer] and the issuing
bank."8"
Some commentators have claimed that principles of contract law
render impossible any working analogy of the letter of credit to a tradi-
tional contractual formula.8 6 They have argued that the beneficiary has
no contractual rights because there is no "meeting of the minds"87 be-
79. See J. Dolan, supra note 1, 6.08, at 6-40 to -41.
80. Id. 6.02, at 6-3 to -4.
81. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-2, at 711 (quoting U.C.C. § 5-101
official comment (1977)). Accordingly, some commentators have referred to the letter of
credit as a "sui generis" legal obligation. See J. Dolan, supra note 1, 2.02, at 2-4; H.
Harfield, supra note 4, at 53; A. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, § 5.52(c), at 144.
82. See U.C.C. § 5-101 official comment (1977).
83. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 1 (1977). The drafters of the Code repeatedly
refer to the letter of credit as a contract. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-106 official comment 2
(1977) ("so far as the customer or beneficiary are concerned establishment of [a revoca-
ble] credit has no legal significance unless the parties provide otherwise in their contracts
with the issuer"); id. § 5-116 official comment 3 (the letter of credit should be "treated
like any other contract").
84. See supra note 75.
85. T. Quinn, supra note 1, 5-101[A][1][b], at 5-3.
86. See, eg., J. Dolan, supra note 1, 2.02, at 2-3 to -4; J. White & IL Summers,
supra note 2, § 18-2, at 711; Joseph, supra note 2, at 850-51; A Solution to the Problem of
Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 857-59, 863; Current Theories and Usages,
supra note 23, at 588-92.
87. The argument is that there is no meeting of the minds because the issuer and
beneficiary do not enter into an "agreement" and because these parties are often un-
known to each other. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-2, at 711; Joseph, supra
note 2, at 850. Under the objective theory of contracts, however, "[a] contract has,
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A
contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties,
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.'" J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 2-2, at 23 (quoting Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F.
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tween the issuer and the beneficiary and because no consideration has
been provided by the beneficiary to the issuer,88 and that the letter of
credit beneficiary cannot properly be regarded as a third party benefici-
ary of the contract between the customer and the issuer.89 These difficul-
ties can be resolved by reference to the option contract.
B. The Letter of Credit as an Option Contract
The letter of credit can best be viewed as an option contract. An op-
tion contract is an irrevocable offer under which one party is bound to
perform at the election of the other, who is not under any obligation.90
When the bank issues a letter of credit it makes a promise to the benefici-
ary, which forms the basis of a contractual relationship. The bank's
287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.), affd sub nom. Ernst v. Mechanics' & Metals
Nat'l Bank, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), affid sub nom. National City Bank v. Hotchkiss,
231 U.S. 50 (1913)). Thus, it is not necessary for the parties to be acquainted prior to
entering into the contract. An offer can even be made to the public in general, provided
that the terms are specific. See id. § 2-8, at 34-35.
The requisite "agreement" is present between the issuer and the beneficiary in the letter
of credit transaction. See 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:4, at 231 (agree-
ment is implied in fact from the terms of the credit and the beneficiary's conduct).
88. The argument is that the beneficiary supplies no consideration for the issuer's
payment obligation. See B. Clark, supra note 6, 8.2[1], at 8-6; J. Dolan, supra note 1, 1
2.02, at 2-3; Joseph, supra note 2, at 850-51; A Solution to the Problem of Documentary
Compliance, supra note 7, at 858 (quoting Kozolchyk I, supra note 51, at 135-36; Current
Theories and Usages, supra note 23, at 589-90.
It is a settled principle of contract law, however, that consideration need not be sup-
plied directly by the promisee; a third party may supply the consideration. See Quat-
tlebaum v. Gray, 252 Ark. 610, 611-12, 480 S.W.2d 339, 340-41 (1972); Cechettini v.
Consumer Assocs., 260 Cal. App. 2d 295, 297, 67 Cal. Rptr. 15, 17 (1968); City of High-
land Park v. Grant-Mackenzie Co., 366 Mich. 430, 446-47, 115 N.W.2d 270, 278 (1962)
(en banc); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 4-1, at 134 n. 12.
In the letter of credit transaction, the customer, a third party, supplies consideration
for the bank's irrevocable offer to the beneficiary. See Bartholomew, Relations Between
Banker and Seller Under Irrevocable Letters of Credit, 5 McGill L.J. 89, 92 (1959); Mc-
Curdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 539, 575-76 (1922). See infra note
92 and 'accompanying text. Moreover, the consideration provided by the customer is
sufficient to support both the bank's promise to its customer and its promise to the benefi-
ciary. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 4-22, at 173-74 (" '[t]here is considera-
tion for a set of promises if what is bargained for and given in exchange would have been
consideration for each promise in the set if exchanged for that promise alone' ") (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 80(1) (1979)).
89. Although there are valid arguments against classifying the letter of credit as a
third party beneficiary contract, see, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, § 18-2, at
714 (noting that the issuer/promisor in the letter of credit transaction, unlike the prom-
isor in the third party beneficiary contract, cannot assert against the beneficiary defenses
he could assert against the customer/promisee); Joseph, supra note 2, at 850-51 (same); A
Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra note 7, at 858-59 (same);
Current Theories and Usages, supra note 23, at 590 (same), some courts have nevertheless
adhered to such a characterization in defining the rights of the parties, see West Va.
Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (mem.); Savage
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 413 F. Supp. 447, 451 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Harvey Estes
Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
90. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 4-15, at 158; see Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 25 (1979).
[Vol. 531532
LETTERS OF CREDIT
promise can be analyzed as an offer looking toward a unilateral contract.
As with offers generally,9 it is only effective when received by the benefi-
ciary.92 In the letter of credit the bank promises to pay if the beneficiary
presents complying documents.93 The bank requests not a return prom-
ise, but a return performance. By presenting complying documents the
beneficiary accepts the offer and provides consideration for the bank's
promise.94 Time is of the essence because the offer cannot be accepted
after it lapses. 95 The offer by the bank to the beneficiary is, of course, not
just a revocable offer. 96 The customer has paid for it. That payment by
the customer is consideration for the irrevocability feature of the offer.
97
In other words, when the bank issues a letter of credit in favor of a bene-
ficiary, the bank makes an irrevocable offer looking to a unilateral con-
tract. In effect, the beneficiary has an option contract. The bank is
91. E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.10, at 125 (1982).
92. U.C.C. § 5-106(1)(b) (1977).
93. See Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423
F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970); Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021,
1024 (N.D. IM. 1975); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36-37
(Colo. 1981) (en banc); First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 814, 256 S.E.2d
383, 385 (1979).
94. Performance by the offeree operates as acceptance of the option contract. See J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 2-27, at 89; E. Farnsworth, supra note 91, § 8.2, at
541. Acceptance of the option contract constitutes consideration for the offeror's prom-
ise. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 4-15, at 158.
95. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Cf J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note
8, § 2-27, at 91 (time is of the essence in the option contract).
96. Theoretically, the letter of credit may be revocable or irrevocable. U.C.C. § 5-103
official comment 1 (1977). It has been suggested, however, that the revocable letter of
credit is an illusory contract. West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107,
1111 (W.D. Pa. 1976); see A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, supra
note 7, at 848 n.1. Because they impose no true obligation on the issuer, revocable letters
of credit have little commercial value. J. Dolan, supra note 1, 5.03[1], at 5-10; see A.
Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 130 n.i.
97. Article Five states that "[n]o consideration is necessary to establish a credit."
U.C.C. § 5-105 (1977). The drafters did acknowledge, however, that consideration is
actually provided for the bank's irrevocable offer by the customer, who pays a fee to the
bank for issuing the letter of credit. See U.C.C. § 5-105 official comment (1977); 6
Michie, supra note 7, at 402. The reason for dispensing with the consideration require-
ment was merely to eliminate the potential burden to the beneficiary in ascertaining what
an issuer has charged as a fee for issuing the credit. 3 R. Anderson, Anderson on the
Uniform Commercial Code § 5-105:1 (2d ed. 1971); 6 Michie, supra note 7, § 28, at 402;
T. Quinn, supra note 1, 5-105[A], at 5-18. Moreover, even in the absence of valid
consideration, a statutory substitute for consideration would suffice to render the offer
irrevocable. For example, the New York General Obligations Law provides that "when
an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing signed by the offeror. . . which
states that the offer is irrevocable during a period set forth. . ., the offer shall not be
revocable during such period. . . because of the absence of consideration for the assur-
ance of irrevocability." N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1109 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-
85); see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 2-27, at 89-90 & n.96; see also U.C.C.
§ 2-205 (1977) (no consideration needed for a firm offer by a merchant for the sale of
goods). The letter of credit is a writing, signed by the issuer, see U.C.C. § 5-104(1)(1977),
with clear language of irrevocability. Eg., J. Dolan, supra note 1, at A-61; H. Harfield,
supra note 4, at 322.
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bound to perform if the beneficiary performs,98 but the beneficiary is not
bound to present the documents. 99
Moreover, the beneficiary's documentary presentment not only consti-
tutes acceptance of the issuer's offer and consideration for the issuer's
promise, but also operates as an express condition precedent' °° to the
issuer's payment obligation. 101 Although the general rule is that express
conditions require literal compliance, 10 2 "there are situations in which
the rule is not always rigidly adhered to."'1 3 A number of excuses have
been carved out to protect the expectations of the parties.' °4 Among
them is the excuse of a condition where "the non-occurrence of [the]
condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, . . . [and] its occur-
rence was [not] a material part of the agreed exchange."'0 5
In the letter of credit transaction, because the bank's wrongful refusal
to pay the draft results in forfeiture of the beneficiary's right to assured
payment, the very purpose of the letter of credit is defeated.10 6 The bene-
ficiary will be compelled to sue the customer for breach of the underlying
contract. Furthermore, the beneficiary cannot be supposed to have as-
sumed the risk of forfeiture in the event of a slight technical discrep-
ancy.'0 7 The beneficiary expects to receive payment against complying
documents; he does not bargain for hypertechnical parsing of the docu-
98. J. Dolan, supra note 1, % 2.01, at 2-2; 6 Michie, supra note 7, § 33(b), at 436.
99. "Although the letter of credit is a contract between banker and beneficiary, the
beneficiary undertakes no duty of performance-if he chooses not to meet the conditions
of the credit, he is not obligated to do so." H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 52; see also E.
Farnsworth, supra note 91, § 8.2, at 541 (offeror is obliged to perform only if the offeree
chooses to exercise the option).
100. 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, §§ 7:15, at 261, 7:26, at 283. A condi-
tion is defined as "an act, or event, other than a lapse of time, which affects a duty to
render a promised performance." J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 11-1, at 383;
see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 (1979) ("an event, not certain to occur,
which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a con-
tract becomes due"). Unilateral contracts often involve express conditions. J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 11-13; see E. Farnsworth, supra note 91, § 8.2, at 541 ("[I]f
an offer has become an option contract ... acceptance of that offer is a condition of the
offeror's duty. The grantor of the option is bound although he will not have to perform if
the option is not exercised."). Intention to render the offeror's duty conditional need not
be expressed directly in writing; it may be manifested by the general nature of the agree-
ment. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 226 comment a (1979).
101. See supra notes 99-100.
102. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 11-15, at 398; see id. § 2-27, at 91.
103. Id. § 11-15, at 398; see E. Farnsworth, supra note 91, § 8.3, at 545.
104. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, §§ 11-31 to -41 (discussion of
various excuses of conditions); E. Farnsworth, supra note 91, § 8.3, at 544 (same).
105. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229 comment c (1979); see E. Farnsworth,
supra note 91, § 8.7.
106. See supra notes 2, 12-19 and accompanying text.
107. "In determining the nature of the event that is made a condition by the agree-
ment,. . . it will not ordinarily be supposed that a party has assumed the risk of forfei-
ture. Where the language is doubtful, an interpretation is generally preferred that will
avoid this risk." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 227 comment c (1979).
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ments.'08 Nor may it be supposed that the issuer and the customer en-
tered into the transaction expecting to be relieved of their obligations
because of technical discrepancies. 19
In addition to the threat of forfeiture, the court must consider the ma-
teriality of the discrepancy.11 ° Analogy to the contractual situations in
which there is a condition of satisfaction 11 provides guidance in evaluat-
ing the beneficiary's documentary presentment. Parties often agree that
the offeror's duty of performance is conditioned on his or a third party's
satisfaction with the offeree's performance.'12 There are generally two
types of satisfaction conditions: personal satisfaction, where evaluation of
performance involves subjective elements of taste and fancy,'" 3 and rea-
sonable satisfaction, where suitability of performance is a matter of
"mechanical fitness, utility, or marketability."" '  The question of docu-
mentary compliance in the letter of credit situation falls squarely within
the second category. While courts will generally defer to a party's deter-
mination of personal satisfaction, they recognize that the mechanical fit-
ness condition imposes "a requirement [that], as a matter of law. . . the
dissatisfaction be reasonable.""' Thus, the court is in a position to de-
termine whether the beneficiary's performance is objectively
satisfactory." 16
The classification of the letter of credit as an option contract alleviates
the problem of applying the vague notion of substantiality to the issuer/
beneficiary relationship. The bank is required to determine whether
there has been compliance with the conditions set by the credit. In this
determination it must consider the possibility of excuse. In practice, the
108. Generally, the letter of credit states merely that drafts will be honored upon pres-
entation of documents "in compliance" with the terms of the credit. See, e.g., J. Dolan,
supra note 1, at A-61 (sample letter of credit); H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 322 (same).
109. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 16, at 121.
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111. Under a condition of satisfaction, a party's performance is conditioned upon his
or a third party's satisfaction with the other contracting party's performance. J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 11-16, at 398.
Although the letter of credit does not expressly provide that documents must be satis-
factory to the bank, the bank's satisfaction is required by the nature of its obligation: The
bank must determine whether or not documents comply with the terms of the credit.
U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977); see 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:26, at 283
("The important thing is if in the satisfaction of the issuer there is conformity in the
goods as evidenced by the documents submitted in compliance with the terms of the
credit then the issuer is duty bound to pay on that credit."). In addition, the bank may
insert in its contract with the customer a satisfaction provision for specified documents.
U.C.C. § 5-114(1) & official comment 1 (1977). But see id. (issuer may not require gen-
eral satisfaction with all documents).
112. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 8, § 11-16, at 398.
113. Id. § 11-18, at 401-02.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 402.
116. See 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:26, at 284 (because documents
are mechanical in nature, the degree of discretion is minimal).
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bank can accomplish this task through the application of a modified ver-
sion of the bifurcated standard.
III. THE BIFURCATED STANDARD AND THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY
OF GOOD FAITH
A. The Virtues of the Bifurcated Standard
By requiring strict compliance between the issuer and the beneficiary
but substantial compliance between the issuer and its customer,11 7 the
bifurcated standard provides the bank with "some leeway for the exercise
of honest judgment, especially in times of falling commodity prices when
the bank may easily get into a cross-fire of pressures." 11 8 This grant of
discretionary power injects into the transaction the flexibility necessary
to ensure the proper functioning of the letter of credit as a payment de-
vice:' 9 The bank need not dishonor a draft because of "microscopic dis-
crepancies." 2' "Indeed, we may argue that a more satisfactory degree of
'certainty' is attained with flexible notions of fairness eliminating the
need to circumvent the inflexible application of mechanical rules."'' In
effect, application of the bifurcated standard should result in greater will-
ingness on the part of the bank to honor the beneficiary's draft when it
reasonably finds "apparent compliance" '122 of the documents with the
credit terms.
It is conceivable, however, that the bank might find itself in a position
in which it is entitled to reimbursement from its customer, but actual
reimbursement may be difficult or impossible to obtain.123 In this situa-
tion, the bank is likely to exercise its discretion to promote its self-inter-
est ' 4 by insisting on strict compliance from the beneficiary. To avoid
this result, the traditional rule of strict compliance should be replaced by
117. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
118. New York Study, supra note 36, at 66, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 36, at
1634; see T. Quinn, supra note 1, 5-1 14[A][8], at S5-22 to -23 (Cum. Supp. No. 2 1984).
119. T. Quinn, supra note 1, % 5-114[A][8], at S5-23.
120. New York Study, supra note 36, at 66-67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 36,
at 1634-35.
121. Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 449 (1964); see 2 A. Squillante & J.
Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:17, at 263 (insistence on exact compliance "would bring credit
commerce to a standstill").
122. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 1 (1977); see New York Study, supra note 36, at
67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 36, at 1635 (bifurcated standard "recognizes that
the conformity of a given document may be a matter of reasonable doubt. Where such
doubt exists, the issuer is not made to act at his peril .
123. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
124. Such an exercise of discretion contravenes the purpose of the letter of credit. The
issuer may not refuse payment of a draft merely because it fears that its customer will not
satisfy its reimbursement obligation. 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:7, at
233; see Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
One court, however, has suggested that payment under the credit may be enjoined once
the customer has filed for bankruptcy. See Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank (In re
Twist Cap, Inc.), 1 Bankr. 284, 285-86 (D. Fla. 1979). Fortunately, this suggestion has
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the law of conditions, applied in analogizing the letter of credit to an
option contract. Thus, the modified bifurcated standard would retain
substantial compliance as the standard in suits by the customer against
the issuer, but would impose the law of conditions in suits by the benefi-
ciary against the issuer. The bank would be required to determine
whether documentary presentment is sufficient to justify excuse of literal
compliance with the express condition. Moreover, the bank would be
under a contractual duty to exercise in good faith the discretionary
power granted under the bifurcated standard. 2 '
B. The Contractual Duty to Exercise Good Faith
There are two possible approaches to determining good faith. One is
the "excluder" analysis propounded by Professor Robert S. Summers.
This approach, rather than specifically defining good faith, focuses on
types of conduct that involve bad faith.'26 Professor Summers includes
in his "bad faith" classification the "abuse of a power to determine com-
pliance."127 The virtue of this approach is its emphasis on "faithfulness
to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expecta-
tions of the [parties]."' 28 Professor Steven J. Burton suggests, however,
that the vagueness of excluder analysis raises the possibility that courts
might adhere to "felt requirements of morality,"'2 9 thereby imposing
terms that may be incompatible with the parties' agreement.' 30 In re-
sponse, Professor Burton suggests a second approach-the so-called
"cost perspective" theory. 3 ' This approach asks two questions in deter-
mining whether the discretion-exercising promisor breached the contract
by using its discretion in bad faith: "(1) At formation, what were the
reasonably expected costs of performance (forgone opportunities) to the
discretion-exercising promisor? (2) At performance, did the discretion-
been overlooked; such a practice "could wreak havoc" on the letter of credit transaction.
Rutcofsky, supra note 7, at xxiii.
125. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment."); see also E. Farnsworth, supra note 91, § 7.17, at 527-28 ('[c]ourts have often
supplied a term requiring a party to exercise good faith when that party has been given a
discretionary power over one of the terms of the contract").
126. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 196, 233 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Summers I]; see Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Concep-
tualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 818 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Summers II]; see also
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 205 comment d (1979) (noting bad faith classi-
fications).
127. Summers I, supra note 126, at 232-33, 240-41.
128. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 205 comment a (1979); accord Burton, More
on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 Iowa L.
Rev. 497, 498-99 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Burton 1]; Summers II, supra note 126, at
821.
129. Burton I, supra note 128, at 499.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 504.
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exercising promisor use its discretion to recapture an opportunity for-
gone on contracting?"' 32
In contracting with its customer and issuing the letter of credit, the
bank commits itself to honor complying drafts. 133 Aware of the risk of
customer insolvency, the bank is likely to ascertain the customer's credit
prior to entering into the contract. 3 4 Nevertheless, one of the "reason-
ably expected costs' 135 of the bank's performance is the risk that the
customer will not satisfy its reimbursement obligation. 136 By issuing the
letter of credit, the bank restricts its use of funds, 137 thereby foregoing
other opportunities that might be more lucrative. If the bank chooses to
dishonor the draft on a minor technicality, it eliminates the risk of not
being reimbursed by the customer, thereby placing the funds at its dispo-
sal. It thus recaptures the foregone opportunity and will be deemed to
have acted in bad faith.' 38
In exercising its discretion, the bank must objectively examine the doc-
uments in comparison to the credit terms, 139 without regard to its rela-
tionship with its customer.' 40 As long as the bank acts within reason, it
will be protected under the bifurcated standard against the customer's
claim for wrongful payment. 141 Furthermore, the requirement under the
modified bifurcated standard that the bank exercise its discretion in good
132. Id. at 506. Another good faith standard discussed by Professor Burton is the
"contemplation standard," which asks two basic questions: "[W]hat was the discretion-
exercising party's purpose in acting; and ... was that purpose within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties?" Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 386 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Burton 11].
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
134. See H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 34; 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1,
§ 7:6, at 232.
135. Burton I, supra note 128, at 506.
136. See 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:7, at 233; see also American
Employers Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 538 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (N.D. I11.
1981) (mem.) (court held that customer's bankruptcy was irrevelant to the bank's duty to
the beneficiary); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92,
102-03 (M.D.N.C.) (issuer held liable to beneficiary despite customer's insolvency), rev'd
on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 512, 516, 227 N.E.2d 839, 840-41, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1967) (court
notes that bank is improperly defending its own interest because it knows of its cus-
tomer's insolvency).
137. Typically, the bank honors the beneficiary's draft with its own funds, not those of
its customer. J. Dolan, supra note 1, 1 2.03, at 2-4; H. Harfield, supra note 4, at 15; see In
re M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 25 Bankr. 608, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
First Sec. Bank, 183 Mont. 378, 387-88, 600 P.2d 173, 179 (1979).
138. With regard to the exercise of discretion and satisfaction with performance, see
supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text, Professor Burton notes that "if a party feigns
dissatisfaction for other reasons, such as a falling market price, the discretion obviously is
being exercised for a purpose not contemplated by the parties. A jury reasonably may
infer that the party was recapturing a forgone opportunity." Burton II, supra note 132,
at 401 (emphasis added).
139. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
141. New York Study, supra note 36, at 67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 36, at
1635.
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faith imposes no additional liability on the bank. There are two devices
in common usage that will continue to provide protection to the paying
bank. First, the bank, upon paying when there is a slight discrepancy,
may request that the beneficiary provide an indemnity 42 in the event
that the discrepancy is ultimately determined to be material. In addition,
the bank typically has a security interest in the merchandise that is the
subject of the underlying buyer/seller contract.' 43 Thus, the bank's ap-
propriate recourse in the case of customer bankruptcy, for example, is
not to deny payment because of a technical discrepancy, but rather to
take possession of the goods in which it has a security interest.144
CONCLUSION
Analogy of the letter of credit to an option contract provides the theo-
retical basis for contractual characterization of the issuer/beneficiary re-
lationship. An application of the bifurcated standard that replaces the
standard of strict compliance with the law of conditions in determining
documentary compliance most effectively serves the purposes of the let-
ter of credit. It alleviates the problems encountered by courts in attempt-
ing to apply the vague notion of substantiality and imposes on the bank a
contractual duty to exercise discretion in good faith when determining
compliance.
Arthur Fama, Jr.
142. U.C.C. § 5-113 (1977); J. Dolan, supra note 1, 6.06[l][b]; 6 Michie, supra note
7, at 425; 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, supra note 1, § 7:23; see Dixon, Irmaos & Cia.,
Ltda. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1944) (noting the reasonableness
and utility of indemnities in the letter of credit transaction), cerL denied, 324 U.S. 850
(1945); Megrah, supra note 23, at 257.
143. Generally, the customer's application for the credit provides, as one of the terms
of the issuer/customer contract, that the issuer receive a security interest in the goods.
See, e.g., J. Dolan, supra note 1, at A-83 (sample application); see id. 2.08[1], at 2-15;
Rutcofsky, supra note 7, at xxiii.
144. 3 R_ Anderson, supra note 97, § 5-114:11 to :13, at 420-21.
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